Antibiotics Don't Work on a SCADA with a Virus! On 10 th April 2008, the BBC reported that computer viruses have passed the one million mark noting that the number of viruses, worms and Trojans in circulation has topped the one million mark. Although it was a new high it is also simply part of a long-term trend that has been going on for a while now with the number of viruses increasing by an order of magnitude every three years. [8] As the BBC and others reported in May 2008 it is also the 30 th anniversary of the rst spam message. The continued push towards greater ef ciency, standardised computer platforms and larger companies with smaller staf ng levels is leading to changes in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Distributed Control Systems (DCS) systems which raise questions about security. This is because of an increasing use of the Internet for monitoring and support (by company and vendor support staff); and the interconnection of SCADA and DCS systems to other business networks to enhance the amount, detail and timeliness of information available to management. With SCADA and DCS operator and engineering stations having moved into the world of the Ethernet network and Personal Computer (PC) technologies rather than "proprietary" systems they have become more vulnerable to computer viruses and worms. There are a number of ways in, some of which may even be designed to be there. For example, a possible path into the control system is the use of third party process optimisation software such as historians and recipe managers, using for example OPC servers. The historian is less of a risk because tunnels can be opened in one direction only from the control system to the enterprise system. However, recipe managers require data written into the control system and here care has to be taken about how that is implemented with control system security in mind. This is where Information Technology meets Control and Instrument Engineering so as C&I Engineers should we care? De nitely. If your plant is affected and you can't see it to control it you have to shut down via some other method than the normal control system (hopefully in a controlled manner) until the problem is solved. The issues begin with safety and move to downtime and lost production.
UK Government concern over this aspect of electronic systems infection was raised by the Earl of Northesk in a question in the House of Lords as to "Whether in the light of recent computer infection from the Sapphire worm, they are taking appropriate steps to protect United Kingdom (UK) servers from possible high-speed viruses and " ash worms" [3] . The answer from Lord Falconer of Thoroton was that "These issues are dealt with by the Governments National Security Co-ordination Centre (NISCC), set up to help protect the UK's critical national infrastructure from electronic attack" [3] .
In the United States, a Government Accountability Of ce report in 2004 [1] included many examples of attacks on control systems including:
• SQL Slammer worm infection of the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Oak Harbour, Ohio in January 2003. A plants safety system monitoring system failed as did the plants process computer. The former took 5 hours to recover and the latter 6 hours. Control system traf c was also blocked on other utilities. At the time the plant was shut down, so the consequences were not as serious as they could have been.
[1] [2] • The 2001 case of a disgruntled employee hacking into a sewage plant in Queensland, Australia, and releasing raw sewage into local parks and waterways. He made at least 46 attempts to take control of the sewage system during March and April 2000, and was jailed for his trouble in October 2001. [4] In May 2008 the Government Accountability Of ce issued a scathing report about cyber security weaknesses at the Tennessee Valley Authority, operator of three nuclear plants. [7] The report highlighted both corporate network vulnerability to cyber attack issues and inadequate protection of the control systems within that network.
And, again in the United States, the Washington Post recently reported the shutdown of a nuclear power plant in March 2008 by its automated safety systems after the implementation of a software patch on a computer in the main of ces linked to the control system that was used to monitor chemical and diagnostic data caused the control system to think that a loss of cooling had occurred on the fuel rods. [6] Although this was not a direct cyber attack, it highlighted the problems that can occur when control systems are connected to of ce/corporate systems without thought being put into the combined network architecture. If it can happen unintentionally, as in this incident, it can also happen through an attack. . This document is comprehensive in its guidance and has many options depending on the speci c requirements of the rewall.
Generally, good practice involves a separate network for the control system and IT networks in an organisation. The detail of how the control system network is then secured depends on the application -remote plant will be protected, by necessity, using a different method to a process monitored locally.
Even if a single rewall does its job -the fact that it allows some data through means it may not stop all computer viruses and worms. There is a subtle difference here. A computer virus needs assistance to propagate, and then act on whichever system they are built to attack. To infect multiple systems they need to use a le transfer system of some sort to spreadtypically email -but any le transfer system will do! A worm on the other hand is usually autonomous and self propagating -using vulnerabilities in systems software to do so.
Whichever the problem, if it gets through the rewall, the virus or worm is free to do its worst. Assuming Regular Paper: Antibiotics Don't Work on a SCADA with a Virus! you update both anti-virus software and deploy all patches to x vulnerabilities correctly when issued by software companies you will be secure -surely? The problem with antivirus software and patches is that they are not vaccines -they do not act before the event. Like antibiotics they act after the event. They may do the job, but like an antibiotic, the anti-virus "patch" against a new virus or worm takes time to develop, test, publicise and distribute. In the mean time your systems are vulnerable. The antidote is always going to arrive after the virus is out in the wild. What is that time lag -a few days possibly? This is illustrated by the Schneier diagram (see Figure 1 below) the shape of which applies equally to both virus and security vulnerabilities.
Notice that the risk curve never returns to zero because even though the patch is issued not everybody installs the patch.
Legend
Anti-virus software producers and software companies strive to minimise the gap between new virus and anti-virus patch. However, the process is reactive -they cannot eliminate it. You could just block Internet access to the control system network and that would be an ideal. But it may not be as "blocked" as you think -what about the service engineer that accesses the network to carry out work on eld devices or the control system itself? What about accessing Fieldbus device drivers from the Internet or remote diagnostic assistance from your control system manufacturer? Is the laptop used for normal of ce work -emails etc and is a Virtual Private Network employed by your control system manufacturer for diagnostic assistance, If so, how secure is it? You may lock down the system in "normal" situations -but are they all covered?
One of the most robust solutions mentioned in the Good Practice Guide [5] is a dual rewall installation with re walls from different manufacturers which makes sense as the rewalls will be susceptible to different attacks.
This could be the use of diverse operating systems on dual rewalls as a possible technique to employ and it is advice that should pay dividends for protection against virus and worm infection.
Most companies' of ce IT networks run on some form of Windows operating system and as a result the SCADA and DCS control systems tend to have followed that path. Because of the widespread use of Windows as an operating system most viruses and worms are targeted at it for maximum effect. Microsoft works hard to secure their systems, but there will always be someone out there targeting the various Windows operating systems. So the instrument and control system technique of diversity on the IT side of the control system and of employing different operating systems as part of the link between the control network and the Internet and / or the of ce IT network can make your system more robust. A UNIX based machine (e.g. Linux server) will tend to be immune from Windows viruses and a Windows machine will tend to be immune from UNIX (or Linux) viruses. The same applies to propagation of worms -if the vulnerability targeted is one within a Windows system component a UNIX system will halt its propagation; and of course, this applies in the reverse, with a UNIX worm being halted by a Windows system. A combination of both operating systems employed in virus and worm protection of the control system seems to make sense.
This will y in the face of many IT department's drive for standardisation, but those responsible for process control networks tend to have a slightly different focus to the IT departments in their use of networks. The former tends to be about plant and human safety; the latter tends to concentrate on system performance and data integrity. Now that the two disciplines are approaching the same problems from different perspectives, there is a role for the Control & Instrument Engineer to assist both in understanding the others needs, and re-de ning the requirements for secure but usable control systems -SCADA or DCS. 
